


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Operational Art and Insurgency War:
Nathanael Greene's Campaign in the Carolinas



by
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School of Advanced Military Studies
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Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

4 April 1988

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ABSTRACT

OPERATIONAL ART AND INSURGENCY WAR: NATHANAEL GREENE'S CAMPAIGN IN THE CAROLINAS. By Major Edward E. Hoffer, USA. 40 pages.

This monograph uses Major General Nathanael Greene's Southern Campaign, 1780-1781, as an historical case study to demonstrate both the validity and the utility of current operational art as it applies to understanding the design and execution of insurgency war.

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I Introduction

Insurgency war continues to be a direct challenge to the United States Army. Our failure in Vietnam and our present involvement with insurgencies in Central America demonstrate the need for a better understanding of this form of war. Some students of insurgency war believe that it is a unique form of war and that our concepts of operational art based upon Clausewitzian and Jominian theories of war do not apply.¹ This paper uses Major General Nathanael Greene's Southern Campaign as an historical case study to demonstrate that operational art does have utility in and can be applied to insurgency war.

Greene's Southern Campaign from 1780 to 1781 is recognized as a prototype for modern insurgency war.² It is an excellent example of war between a militarily sophisticated army and an insurgent army. Greene skillfully combined regular, irregular, and guerrilla forces in a brilliant campaign that achieved its operational objective: the defeat of British military power in the Southern theater of war. In many respects the insurgency war in the South was unique; yet the examination of it in terms of our operational art gives us many insights into understanding past, present, and, possibly, future insurgency wars. Before proceeding with an analysis of Greene's campaign, we should establish what is currently meant by insurgency war and operational art.

There is considerable disagreement in the literature and in military

circles regarding what the term "insurgency" means. Adding to the confusion is the fact that a variety of terms are used interchangeably. Rebellion, revolt, revolution, peasant war, guerrilla war, and people's war are all used to describe an insurgency. The key thought behind all these terms is that they describe efforts by a group of people which represent a fundamental challenge to an existing political order and to those holding power. Although all wars are political in nature, wars of insurgency differ from conventional war because they are centered on the political-social system as the main objective or end state. This separates insurgency war from conventional war which is characterized by battles between complementary military organizations whose objective is the destruction of the opposing military force. There are many ways that insurgents can attempt to gain political control. Regardless of the method used, each insurgency will become distinct and insurgents will establish methods to fit their own situation. However, insurgencies can be generally separated into four broad categories. These categories provide a basis for understanding and comparing insurgency wars. They are: politically organized insurgency, militarily organized insurgency, traditionally organized insurgency, and urban insurgency.³ Insurgencies of several types may occur simultaneously within the same conflict. This is indeed the case with the American Revolutionary War.

Within the New England Colonies a mature political insurgency had developed prior to 1775. Its organizational structure was based upon an extensive, complex political structure that had developed before military operations were initiated. It had created a shadow government capable of challenging British authority. This political accomplishment preceded the

military necessity to protect the political insurgency that was thrust upon General George Washington. Lacking the mature political structure of New England, the Southern insur_g adopted a military structure. Small decentralized armed insurgent groups attempted to serve as a catalyst for mobilizing opposition against British control. These groups attempted to destroy British and Loyalist legitimacy by military action. In the South military success was necessary before insurgent political consolidation could take place.⁴ Having defined insurgency, we can now turn our attention to understanding what is meant by operational art.

The United States Army defines operational art as "the employment of military forces to attain strategic goals in a theater of war or theater of operations. . . ." ⁵ It goes on to state that this is accomplished "through the design, organization, and conduct of campaigns and major operations."⁶ Within these simple statements are several complementary concepts. Operational art must entail a careful understanding of the relationship of ends, means, ways, and risks. For an operational commander, operational art is created when he determines what military conditions must be produced in his theater of war to achieve the strategic goal--"ends"; what resources he must have to achieve his ends--"means"; what methods should be used to achieve his ends--"ways"; and what risks he will accept when ways and means do not, as is often the case, guarantee the achievement of the ends. Finally, operational art, the balancing of means, ways, and risks to produce a strategic end, is approached by the design and conduct of campaigns. Present military theory emphasizes the importance of several key concepts which are fundamental to the design and conduct of a campaign. These are: the necessity for battle, centers of gravity, lines

of operations, and culminating points.⁷ Each of these concepts will be discussed as it applies to Nathanael Greene's campaign. To appreciate how Greene approached the practice of operational art, it is necessary to place his campaign within the strategic context of the American War for Independence.

II The Southern Theater and the Revolution

When Nathanael Greene assumed command of American forces in the Southern theater of war in December of 1780, the War for Independence was entering its sixth year. After France, in 1778, and Spain, in 1779, declared war against Great Britain, the British had to treat their North American colonies as a secondary theater. The necessity to fight European enemies in the West Indies and to maintain a home naval fleet strong enough to guard against invasion severely weakened the British effort against the American rebels. However, the American revolutionaries were unable to take advantage of Britain's difficult military situation because their own effort suffered from war weariness, lack of strong direction, and inadequate finance. Despite their many new commitments, the British were able to maintain in America an army that was always greatly superior in numbers to the dwindling Continental Army. Although it outnumbered the Continental Army by as much as three to one, the British army was never again strong enough to undertake offensive operations on the scale of those of 1776 and 1777.

The battle at Monmouth Courthouse on June 27, 1778, was the last battle in the Northern theater of war between the American and British

armies until Yorktown over three years later. By 1779, the military situation in the Northern theater had become a stalemate, and it remained so until the end of the war. Washington held to a strategy of attrition whose objective was the exhaustion of British patience and the preservation of his army. Hence, the war around New York became largely an affair of raids, skirmishes, and constant vigilance on both sides.⁸

In the summer of 1780, the American War of Independence seemed to have reached a nadir. At Morristown, New Jersey, in the winter of 1779-80, the Continental Army suffered worse hardships than at Valley Forge. The Continental currency had virtually depreciated out of existence, and Congress was unable to pay soldiers or to purchase supplies. Under such difficulties, Washington had to struggle to hold his army together. Recruitment of Continentals became impossible. While recruiting failed, morale among those men still under arms fell disastrously. Mutinies in 1780 were suppressed only by measures of great severity. Adding to the despair of the American cause was the virtual triumph of British forces over the revolution in the South.

Late in 1778, the British began to turn their main effort to the South. Loyalist strength was greater in the Carolinas and Georgia. These colonies were also much closer to the West Indies where the British Atlantic Fleet had to stand guard against the French. Lord Germain, the American Colonial Minister, hoped to bring the Southern colonies under British control one by one. From bases there he would then mount military operations against the North. In the winter of 1778-79, a small British force operating from northern Florida quickly overran thinly populated Georgia. Alarmed by this success, Congress sent Major General Benjamin

Lincoln south to Charleston in December of 1778 to command the Southern Army and to rally the Southern militia.

General Lincoln gathered over 3,000 Continentals and militiamen. In May of 1779, while he was operating near the Georgia border, the British commander, Major General Augustine Prevost, slipped around Lincoln to lay siege to Charleston. Charleston barely managed to hold out until Lincoln could return with his force to relieve it.

In September of 1779, the French Admiral d'Estaing arrived off the coast of Georgia with a strong fleet and over 6,000 soldiers. Lincoln, with 1,350 Continentals, joined him in a siege of the British base at Savannah. The Franco-American operation had to hurry its attack because d'Estaing was unwilling to risk his fleet in a position dangerously exposed to the autumn storms. The French and Americans, abandoning their plan to make a systematic siege, mounted a direct assault on Savannah on October 9. The British, in strongly entrenched positions, repulsed the attack. The French and Americans suffered staggering losses. D'Estaing then sailed for the West Indies and Lincoln returned to Charleston.

Heartened by the success of British forces in the South, Germain became determined to expand the British Southern Campaign. This time, however, British strategy differed from previous ones. Crucial to gaining victory in the South was the concept of creating and supporting a Loyalist counterrevolution. No longer would British forces attempt to occupy and secure conquered territory. Germain's plan instructed that once territory was cleared of rebel forces it would be turned over to loyal Americans for police and defense. This would allow British regular forces to proceed with the destruction of rebel control in other areas. With skill and

patience, this process would allow a relatively small British army to conquer the South.⁹

Prompted by Germain, General Clinton began the British Southern Campaign in earnest. In late October he withdrew the British forces from Rhode Island, pulled in his units from outposts around New York, and prepared to move against Charleston with 8,708 soldiers. Clinton executed a brilliantly planned and coordinated sea and ground attack. Landing his force and attacking Charleston from the land side, he forced Lincoln to mass his forces directly in front of the British, leaving the harbor defenses lightly manned. On April 8 British warships, under Vice Admiral Marriot Arbuthnot, successfully forced their way into the harbor, threatening Charleston from the sea. The ensuing siege proceeded in traditional eighteenth century fashion. On May 12, 1780, Lincoln surrendered his entire force of 5,466 men, resulting in the most decisive British victory of the war. Crowning this British triumph was the destruction of a 350 man relief column under the command of Colonel Abraham Buford. Lieutenant Colonel Banastre Tarleton, with a force of British cavalry, took Buford by complete surprise at the Waxhaw, a district near the North Carolina border. Refusing to honor the white flag that Buford displayed, Tarleton slaughtered most of the defenseless command.

After the capture of Charleston, Clinton, pleased with his achievement, returned to New York, leaving Lieutenant General Charles Earl Cornwallis with 8,000 men to follow up the victory. Cornwallis established his main seaboard bases at Savannah, Beaufort, Charleston, and Georgetown. In the interior, he extended British control along the Savannah River westward to Ninety-Six and northward to Camden and Rocky Mount.

Inhabitants by the hundreds presented themselves to British authorities and announced their allegiance to the Crown, including militia General Andrew Williamson who handed over the fortifications at Ninety-Six to the King's representatives.¹⁰

The British formed the Loyalists into a royal militia organization under Major Patrick Ferguson. This royal militia was soon patrolling the countryside and serving with British garrisons. In desperation Congress sent two understrength Continental regiments from Washington's army to form the nucleus of a new Southern Army around which the militia could rally. They arrived on June 22, 1780, at Hillsboro, North Carolina. In July Congress, without consulting Washington, named Major General Horatio Gates, the hero of Saratoga, to command the Southern Army. Quickly gathering a force of 4,000 men, mostly militia, he set out to attack the British post at Camden, South Carolina. Cornwallis, using Loyalist cavalry to report Gates's movements, moved north from Charleston with reinforcements. His army of 2,200 British regulars made contact with Gates outside Camden on the night of August 15. In the battle that occurred the following morning, Cornwallis crushed the militia formations. General Johann DeKalb was killed while leading his outnumbered Continentals in a valiant but hopeless fight. Tarleton's cavalry pursued the fleeing Americans for 30 miles, killing or taking prisoner those who had survived the battle. Gates himself fled too fast for Tarleton, reaching Hillsboro, North Carolina, 160 miles away, in three days. The Southern Army was destroyed. At Hillsboro Gates was able to gather only 760 survivors. To complete the disaster, Tarleton caught up with General Sumter, whom Gates had sent with a detachment to raid a British wagon train. On August 18, at Fishing Creek,

Tarleton surprised Sumter and virtually destroyed his force.

When news of these events reached Europe, the foreign minister of France suggested that his American allies would have to make peace.¹¹

Britain was in undisputed possession of Northern Florida, Georgia, South Carolina, and most of North Carolina. The American Southern Army had, for all practical purposes, ceased to exist. Southern militia forces had been decimated twice within three months. Only a weak and uncoordinated military insurgency remained.

The military insurgency in the South was born out of the state of political turmoil that existed prior to 1775. News of Lexington and Bunker Hill only deepened divisions among a population already divided along political, religious, ethnic, and geographic lines. In the Carolinas fratricidal bloodletting broke out between coastal English and Huguenot plantation owners who supported the revolution and upland Scotch-Irish small farmers loyal to the Crown.¹² Both groups raised armed organizations and began to clash with each other in sharp and often brutal skirmishes. These hastily organized bands often concentrated on terrorizing their enemies. Both Loyalists and rebels burned and looted homes and plantations in an attempt to drive their opposition into submission. Other groups on both sides formed into semi-orthodox military organizations. Colonel Alexander Lillington, Colonel James Moore, and Richard Caswell met in North Carolina a Loyalist force of over 1500 under the command of Donald McDonald, an eighty-year-old veteran of Culloden at Moore's Creek Bridge, and won a patriot victory.¹³ Colonel Richardson, in South Carolina, raised a force of 1200 men which captured Loyalist leaders and ". . . not only disarmed hundreds of Loyalists, but compelled many of them to pledge

themselves to pacific behavior in the future."¹⁴ Loyalist and Patriot numbers remained equal in strength with the Patriots gaining ascendancy through better skill at arms.

The success of the rebel military insurgency was quickly reversed by the introduction of British regular forces. This reversal demonstrates the vulnerability of a military insurgency to aggressive military action when it lacks a mature political structure to support it. The disasters that befell Generals Lincoln and Gates almost overwhelmed the insurgency. Rebel logistical and communication networks were easily destroyed by Loyalist forces. Lacking solid popular support, the military insurgency was subject to isolation and suppression, as the Loyalists now seized the advantage of British occupation. American militia forces in the South disbanded. Captured militia were "permitted to return to their respective homes as prisoners of war on parole, which parole, as long as they observe, shall secure them from being molested in their property by the British troops."¹⁵ Key rebel leaders such as General Sumter and Colonel Pickens accepted pardon and retired to their homes. Rebel guerrilla units dispersed and members returned to their farms. Only two guerrilla companies under the leadership of the former Indian fighter and Continental Army officer Lieutenant Colonel Francis Marion continued to operate from deep within the backwoods of Georgia and the swamps of South Carolina.

The near collapse of the insurgency in the South, however, was short-lived. Within three months it would grow rapidly and would be a key factor in the destruction of British power in the South. Clinton's pacification policy was responsible for this reversal in British fortunes. Prior to departing for New York, Clinton issued a proclamation which

reversed his earlier lenient terms. In effect, the proclamation gave the inhabitants of the Carolinas two choices: to swear allegiance to the Crown and to fight their countrymen, or to be identified as "rebels and enemies to their country, subject to strong reprisals."¹⁶ Cornwallis was startled by Clinton's proclamation and at the response it provoked in the population. The proclamation left no middle ground for rebels who believed that it violated the provisions of their parole, or for the majority of the population who wished to remain neutral. Compelled to choose between rebellion and collaboration, many felt forced to join the insurgency once again. Many who tried to remain neutral were subject to British and Loyalist depredations which inspired them to rearm and actively support the revolution. Although the Southern Scotch-Irish had been supportive of British efforts, the British angered them with a deliberately hostile policy towards the Presbyterian church. Throughout August and September of 1780, British and Loyalist forces carried out harsh reprisals against pardoned rebels and non-rebel civilians who refused to actively support the Crown.

This dramatic change in policy had its effect. General Sumter, "The Gamecock", attempting to live quietly near Statesburgh, became "all sweat and fury"¹⁷ after Tarleton's cavalry burned his plantation house. For the remainder of the war Sumter organized a guerrilla force that operated against the British and which grew in strength to over 1,000 highly trained and dedicated soldiers. Colonel Andrew Pickens, retired at Long Cane Creek near Ninety-Six, a veteran of colonial Indian wars and an insurgent leader prior to taking a British loyalty oath, kept his pledge until Loyalists plundered his plantation. Pickens, who had led guerrilla

forces until his pardon, again organized and led a five hundred man guerrilla force. By late summer Marion's command had also tripled in size to over 750 men. The military insurgency had survived and later, under Greene's direction, would demonstrate to Cornwallis its decisive power.

Cornwallis, restless and ambitious, sought and received consent to expand the British Southern Campaign into North Carolina as far as the Virginia border. During the first week of September, Cornwallis began his operation. He sent Major Patrick Ferguson, who had successfully organized Loyalists in the upcountry of South Carolina, to move north simultaneously with his "American volunteers", extending British control to the North Carolina back country. Ferguson was then to join with Cornwallis at Charlotte, bringing with him a maximum number of Loyalist recruits. Having heard of Loyalist depredations, the "over-mountain men" in western North Carolina, southwest Virginia, and east Tennessee organized to halt Ferguson's advance. In an astonishing model of coordination, these rebel forces surrounded and destroyed Ferguson's force at King's Mountain on October 7. Simultaneously, William R. Davie and William Lee Davidson inspired the Scotch-Irish inhabitants of the Catawba area in North Carolina to wage guerrilla war against Cornwallis' outposts and foraging parties. Sumter, Marion, and Pickens moved against British supply columns and Cornwallis' lines of communication. Angered at these attacks, Cornwallis ordered his officers to "take the most vigorous measures to extinguish the rebellion."¹⁸ Executions became commonplace as the British attempted to crush the insurgency. Terror provoked counter-terror, and soon the countryside was engulfed in a brutal war with no quarter asked for or given. Frustrated in his movements by the growing insurgency, disappointed

by the sudden timidity of the region's Loyalists, and shocked by the annihilation of Major Ferguson's command, Cornwallis withdrew his army to South Carolina.¹⁹ Shortly after Cornwallis reached his decision to withdraw, General Washington ordered Major General Nathanael Greene to assume Gates' command.

III Greene Takes Command

When in the fall of 1780 Congress asked Washington to name a Southern general, he did not hesitate in his choice. Nathaniel Greene had already emerged as Washington's ablest lieutenant. Greene was a Rhode Islander, the son of Quaker parents, but he had been disavowed by the Friends' Meeting when he raised a company of militia in 1774. Six months later, when the state raised three regiments to send to Boston, it commissioned Greene a brigadier general. A month later Congress confirmed him in rank in the Continental Line. Before the year was over he had become Washington's most reliable commander. He had fought in every major engagement from White Plains to Monmouth Courthouse and, at the time of his appointment to the Southern theater of war, he had just completed a tour of duty as the army's quartermaster general. Washington demonstrated his faith in Greene by purposely not giving him specific instructions. He left Greene "to govern [himself] entirely, according to [his] own prudence and judgement and the circumstances in which [he found himself]."²⁰

Greene would demonstrate throughout the next ten months that he was a master of operational art. His employment of regular, guerrilla, and militia forces to attain strategic goals in the Southern theater of war

through the design, organization, and conduct of the forthcoming campaign would be nothing short of brilliant.

Greene was an ardent nationalist dedicated to achieving the strategic goal that he and Washington had sought through five years of war: the total independence of the thirteen "United States". Greene realized that, to achieve this end in the Southern theater of war, he must "protect the revolution."²¹ This could only be accomplished by regaining control over the population. To do so he would have to create means and ways that would cause British and Loyalist military forces to relinquish their control of the countryside. From the moment he assumed command, Greene maintained his focus on what he felt was the operational end he must achieve to gain the strategic ends. This operational end was the destruction of British forces in the Carolinas. Greene immediately began to create the means and devise the ways to obtain this operational end.

Greene knew he had little means available. He was painfully aware of the lack of men and supplies in the South. Washington professed his inability to furnish him any reinforcements. Greene visited Philadelphia and sought clothing, money, and additional troops without success. In Maryland he pleaded with state officials and merchants for help. In Virginia Greene appealed to Governor Thomas Jefferson for horses, wagons, and men. Everywhere the reply was the same. Money was either exhausted or consisted of worthless paper; men and supplies must be retained to protect the states from invasion. These disappointments led General Greene to concentrate more on devising ways to overcome his poverty of means.²²

Throughout his journey to North Carolina, Greene pondered the question of what was the best way to gain his operational end. By the time

he arrived at Charlotte on December 2, he had reached a bold and innovative decision. As he explained to President Samuel Huntington of Congress, guerrilla operations would have to suffice until he could build a trained and disciplined regular force to oppose Cornwallis. With a regular force he would work in cooperation with guerrilla units to force British and Loyalist forces to concentrate for fear of being attacked piecemeal and overwhelmed. This in turn would encourage "the militia to come forth" and protect "the persons and property of the Inhabitants . . . and check and restrain the depredation of the Enemy."²³ Greene felt that, with the scarce means available, this was the best way to "protect the revolution". Greene recognized that in the South the cooperation between the British Army and Loyalist forces was their source of strength or balance—what we today would term their "strategic center of gravity". Without British regular forces, Loyalists could no longer be protected from guerrilla or militia attacks. Likewise, British regular forces could not control the countryside and the inhabitants without Loyalists garrisoning British posts and conducting security duties. This cooperation was the source of British strength. Greene realized that the British operational center of gravity, what Clausewitz defined as "the hub of all power and movement on which everything depends,"²⁴ was the four regular regiments directly under the command of Major General Lord Cornwallis. Greene knew that as long as this force could support and defend the scattered British and Loyalist posts and garrisons throughout the Carolinas, British control of the South would continue. By destroying Cornwallis' army, Greene could end the cooperation between British and Loyalist forces and reverse the counterrevolution that was taking place. With his end established, Greene concentrated on

creating means.

From Charlotte, Greene wrote Washington that he felt "cavalry and partisan corps were best adapted to . . . the state of war" in the South.²⁵ Washington approved of Greene's plans and sent Lieutenant Colonel "Light Horse Harry" Lee's mixed cavalry and infantry Legion to join him. Greene immediately applied himself to rebuilding his army. His first objective was to make his army as self-sufficient and as secure as possible. He replaced his quartermaster with the young and dynamic Colonel Carrington, instructing him to procure "500 felling Axes, 5,000 pairs of Horse Shoes, . . . half a Ton of Boat nails . . . [along with] the Tools that will be necessary for building about 100 large Batteaus. . . ."²⁶ Greene needed these flatbottomed boats to insure that his army could rapidly cross the many rivers that traversed his theater of war for "quick maneuver or retreat."²⁷ Greene determined that the Southern Army needed to occupy a more secure base. He ordered famed Polish engineer Colonel Tadeusz Kosciuszko to find a base along the Pee Dee River where provisions and forage were plentiful. Kosciuszko decided on a location near Cheraw and, on the day after Christmas, the army settled down at its new base. Cheraw was close enough to maintain patriot morale in the Carolinas and it also afforded a secure line of retreat in the event that Cornwallis should move against Greene's army before it was ready. Greene's creation of means found many expressions. Subordinates discovered that the new commander's appetite for information and intelligence was insatiable. He supervised members of his command in conducting a thorough reconnaissance of his theater of operations. Rivers were inspected for navigability, and fords were mapped. Mountain passes were investigated, and road conditions and

mileage were recorded. Soon Greene was in possession of a "good Geographer's Survey." Greene also directly concerned himself with the training and the instilling of discipline throughout his command.²⁸

On paper the Southern Army numbered 2,300 men. but less than 1,500 were present and fit for duty. There were 950 Continentals but only enough uniforms and equipment to properly clothe and arm 800 men. In addition to the army's physical state, morale and discipline had suffered. "The officers have got such a habit of negligence, and soldiers so loose and disorderly that it is next to impossible to give it a military complexion."²⁹ Greene solved the problem with his officers by using tact and common sense. He invited the officers to his tent for meals where the food was Spartan but the conversation easy and informative. Greene was well-read and intelligent, and he was a good listener. As the officers learned to know their commander and learn from him, they soon came to trust him and to emulate him. The matter of troop discipline was different. Soldiers soon came to understand that orders would be obeyed, camps would be policed, and uniforms and equipment, however well-worn, would be neat and clean. Looting was forbidden and violators were severely punished. Those charged with desertion were tried and, if convicted, were hung. Greene's men discovered that the new commander missed no detail, and he demanded equal thoroughness of his subordinates. The word among the troops was, "It is new Lords, new Laws, a new Army."³⁰

Within a month of his arrival Greene had turned his troops' despondency into ardor. He had also established a reliable wagon commissary and transport system. He had become thoroughly knowledgeable of his area of operations. To add to the security of his army, he had

established over twenty supply magazines with up to two days of supply throughout his rear area. In addition to these exhausting duties, Greene concentrated on establishing a coordinated guerrilla and regular army campaign.

Greene viewed guerrilla operations as an essential component of his plan. Greene realized that guerrilla warfare could not succeed alone against the full force of a coordinated British and Loyalist counter-guerrilla campaign. The Southern Army must always insure that British forces could not disperse into small mobile units capable of seeking and then destroying guerrilla formations. Just as Greene's army allowed guerrilla units more freedom of action, active guerrilla operations created freedom of action for his army. Greene used skillful diplomacy, common sense, and tact in bringing guerrilla leaders under his control. He took great care to explain to Marion, Sumter, and Pickens that he did not intend to place officers between himself and their commands. Greene strengthened guerrilla and regular coordination by providing scarce weapons, clothing, food, and forage. The most far-reaching decision regarding guerrilla operations was to attach regular army forces to guerrilla commands. This integration of guerrilla and regular units operating together raised guerrilla morale, fostered a spirit of unity of purpose, and did much to eliminate parochial interest. Combined guerrilla and regular army operations would be "the salvation of this country." As Greene patiently reminded Sumter in a letter, guerrilla operations alone:

are most necessary and should not be neglected, and yet, they should not be pursued to the prejudice of more important concerns. You may strike a hundred strokes, and reap little benefit from them, unless you₁ have a good Army to take advantage of your success

Greene's success in revitalizing his army and guerrilla units soon had the desired effect on North and South Carolina militia. Militiamen in ever increasing numbers began to arrive at Cheraw. More importantly, they began to augment the guerrilla organizations of Marion, Sumter, and Pickens. The Southern Army commander now instructed his guerrilla units to harass the Loyalists and to "fix plans for procuring . . . Information and conveying it to me with all Dispatch."³² Greene was already beginning to create conditions (ways) that would lead to success.

IV The Insurgency Campaign

Greene began to create the ways necessary for success by dividing his army. He placed 320 Maryland and Delaware Continentals, 100 dragoons of William Washington's cavalry, and 200 Virginia riflemen under Brigadier General Daniel Morgan and sent him across the Catawba River to seek supplies, rally patriots, and threaten British posts at Augusta and Ninety-Six. Cornwallis found it amazing that his weaker opponent had divided his army. But Greene knew precisely what he was doing:

It makes the most of my inferior force, for it compels my adversary to divide his, and holds in doubt as to his line of conduct. He cannot leave Morgan behind him to come at me, or his posts at Ninety-Six and Augusta would be exposed. And he cannot chase Morgan far I can have the whole country open before me. I am as near to Charleston as he is, and as near Hillsborough as I was at Charlotte; so that I am in no danger of being cut off from my reinforcements while an uncertainty as to my future designs has made it necessary to leave a large detachment of the enemy's late reinforcements in Charleston.³³

Greene also sent "Light Horse Harry" Lee and 300 men of his well-equipped and armed Legion to Colonel Marion to interdict the British supply line along the Pee Dee River. Soon both Morgan and Marion were

threatening British posts and destroying Loyalist forces in Cornwallis' rear. By coordinating his plan with guerrilla units Greene effectively surrounded Cornwallis. British attempts at resupply or communication required large armed escorts which drew further manpower from British efforts to control the countryside. Greene carefully controlled the area in which his dispersed units operated. He insured that they were never in a position where they could be isolated by British troops and destroyed. Greene insisted that his commanders plan operations of quick maneuver and, when necessary, "quick retreat". He reminded Morgan:

It is not my wish you should come to action unless you have a manifest advantage and a moral certainty of succeeding. Put nothing to the hazard. A retreat may be disagreeable, but it is not disgraceful. ³⁴

Cornwallis saw that his control of the South Carolina countryside was being threatened. Angered by the resurgence of what only two months before was a disheartened and defeated rebel militia, he decided he must act. Cornwallis was unusual for a high-ranking British officer. He was an aggressive commander who was willing to take the war to his enemy. Cornwallis was determined to risk everything on a renewed invasion of North Carolina. He believed that by moving against Greene's base of operation he could force Greene to battle and thus destroy his army. Cornwallis felt that Greene's army was the rebel center of gravity. The destruction of Greene's army, like that of Lincoln's and Gates' forces, would allow British and Loyalists to concentrate successfully on destroying rebel guerrilla and militia forces.

Ignoring Clinton's warnings, Cornwallis depleted his Charleston base by bringing almost all supplies forward. In the face of Greene's dispositions, Cornwallis divided his army into three parts. He sent a

holding force to Camden to contain Greene. Tarleton was sent with a fast-moving contingent of 1,100 infantry and cavalry to locate and crush Morgan. The remainder of the British army would move into North Carolina to cut off any of Morgan's force that escaped Tarleton. Tarleton started after Morgan on January 6, 1781. Both Morgan and Greene were informed by guerrilla units of the British movements. They immediately started to concentrate their forces. Morgan began a withdrawal towards Greene by crossing the Pacolet and moving rapidly toward the Broad River. The hard-riding Tarleton moved rapidly towards Morgan and, disobeying instructions, pushed his force beyond mutual supporting distance from Cornwallis' force. Morgan hoped to cross the Broad about twenty miles west of Charlotte, but on January 16 Tarleton's advance guard closed with Washington's cavalry which was screening Morgan's rear. By nightfall Morgan was still six miles from the crossing of the Broad, and his lead reconnaissance brought word that the river was swollen from recent rains. Washington reported that Tarleton's main body was less than ten miles away. Morgan, aware that Tarleton was now beyond the support of Cornwallis, decided to battle. The next day he achieved a tactical masterpiece. By judicious use of terrain and a brilliant employment of the militia that had swelled his numbers, Morgan annihilated Tarleton's forces at Hannah's Cowpens. Tarleton barely managed to escape with some of his dragoons. The Americans had about 75 killed and wounded.

The total destruction of Tarleton's command was a devastating blow to Cornwallis. The late English historian Eric Robsen considered the destruction of the "Legion" almost "equivalent" to the loss of an entire army.³⁵ Tarleton's forces had been the most valuable unit of Cornwallis'

army. The Legion was fast and far-ranging. It was invaluable in reconnaissance and in protecting the flanks and rear of Cornwallis' army from guerrilla attack. Now the famed Legion was gone, and Cornwallis, angered by Tarleton's defeat, committed his army to destroying Morgan before he could join Greene's army. Despite the setback to Tarleton, Cornwallis' plan was still sound. If he could keep Morgan and Greene separated, his veteran regulars and the Loyalists could destroy the two separate formations of the rebel army with ease.

Reinforced by 1,500 men from Clinton's Northern Army, Cornwallis remained considerably stronger than Morgan and Greene combined. In an attempt to catch Morgan, Cornwallis directed his army to destroy all their equipment and supplies except what they could carry in their haversacks. All tents, baggage, heavy equipment, and wagons were destroyed. Cornwallis spared only his salt, ammunition, and four ambulance wagons with medical stores. Having converted his army to light infantry, Cornwallis set out from Ransour's Mills, 17 miles from Cowpens, determined to run the rebels into the ground. However, Morgan, following Greene's orders, had withdrawn immediately from the battlefield and was again moving towards Greene. Upon hearing the news from Cowpens, Greene recalled Lee from Marion. He sent instructions to all guerrilla units to converge around the advancing Cornwallis and to "close the country to him."³⁶ Greene set his army into motion under Brigadier General Isaac Huger and rode to join the ailing Morgan to lead him in a brilliant withdrawal. When informed that Cornwallis had destroyed his stores, Greene is quoted as saying, "Then he is ours!"³⁷

Greene now concentrated on forcing Cornwallis to exhaust himself

pursuing Greene's army. Greene had from experience an understanding of another key operational concept which we now term "culminating points". Greene's plan was to force Cornwallis to exceed his culminating point. This point occurs where an attacker loses his relative combat power advantage to the defender because of overextension. This happens because the "lengthening lines of support and the cumulative effects of battle losses and rear area protection efforts sap the attackers's strength and compel him to assume the defense if he has been unable to defeat the defender."³⁸

Greene continued to draw in his dispersed forces while simultaneously withdrawing. His thorough reconnaissance, his preparation of numerous supply caches, and his building of boats now paid off. The Southern Army ferried across rain-swollen rivers and creeks while Cornwallis' men had to seek and cross inundated fords against harassing fire from Greene's rear guards.

British soldiers were unused to the deprivations that Cornwallis' burning of their wagon train caused. They suffered bitterly as they marched through the North Carolina mud and winter rain in pursuit of Greene's army. Colonel Marion's guerrillas cut Cornwallis' lines of supply and thus forced his army to subsist on raw Indian cornmeal. For two weeks Greene maneuvered his forces, often traveling thirty miles a day in bitter weather. Morgan and Greene's forces under Huger finally joined together at Guilford Courthouse. Greene, determined to lead Cornwallis on as long a chase as possible, continued to withdraw while often changing directions as he approached the Dan River. A popular rhyme of the times aptly sums up the situation:

Cornwallis led a country dance,
The like was never seen, Sir,
Much retrograde and much advance,
And all with General Greene, Sir.³⁹

At the Dan River on the North Carolina-Virginia border, the fords were flooded, but Greene had his boats waiting for him. Cornwallis, in a desperate attempt to catch Greene, covered forty miles in the last twenty-four hours before he reached the Dan. Greene's rear guard under the command of Lee marched the same distance in sixteen hours and then fought the British advance guard under Tarleton for four hours allowing the Southern Army to cross the Dan. Cornwallis's forces had been skillfully lured into extending far beyond their offensive culminating point. Now they would experience the consequences.

Almost immediately after crossing the Dan, Greene sent first Washington's cavalry then Lee's Legion back across the Dan to destroy any attempt by Cornwallis to reinforce his army. He knew that Cornwallis was exhausted and that his lines of communication and supply were cut by Pickens' and Marion's guerrillas. Cornwallis had lost over 500 men: 250 from sickness and desertion. His force now numbered less than 2000 and he was without valuable stores and equipment. Greene and his able subordinates increased their pressure on Cornwallis. Reconnaissance and foraging parties were ambushed. Greene described the action:

"To skirmish with [Cornwallis] was my only chance. Those happened daily, and the enemy suffered considerably. . . . Here has been the field for the exercise of genius and an opportunity to practice all the great and little arts of war."⁴⁰

Greene understood the benefits of his tactics and their effect: the hastening of the culmination of the attack. Greene's disposition of forces now gave him the advantage of both interior and exterior lines of

operation. Greene's army operated on interior lines. "Its operations diverge from a central point"⁴¹ and, therefore, it was closer to separate enemy forces than the latter were to each other. Interior lines benefit a weaker force such as Greene's by allowing it to shift its effort laterally more rapidly than the enemy. But Greene's guerrilla forces also allowed him to have the benefit of exterior lines. "A force is said to be operating on exterior lines when its operations converge on the enemy,"⁴² offering it the opportunity to encircle and annihilate an opponent. Using the benefits of both interior and exterior lines, Greene maneuvered his forces back across the Dan to destroy Loyalist reinforcements and simultaneously to continue to maintain pressure on Cornwallis' army. At the How River General Pickens' guerrillas and Lee's Legion ambushed and destroyed a 400 man contingent of North Carolina Loyalists under Colonel John Pyle attempting to reinforce Cornwallis. Morgan's success at Cowpens, Greene's successful harassment and exhaustion of Cornwallis' army, and the destruction of Pyle's Loyalists brought North Carolina and Southern Virginia militia out in strength. Greene's army swelled to twice Cornwallis' in number. Greene had deceived his enemy, causing him to extend far beyond his offensive culminating point. Greene's defensive culminating point was near. He would not gain further benefits from withdrawing. On a battlesite of his own choosing, Greene decided to engage his opponent in conventional battle.

The roles had reversed. Greene's army sensed that the game of exhausting the enemy was over. Major St. George Tucker wrote his wife on March 13, "We marched yesterday to look for Lord Cornwallis We are now strong enough, I hope, to cope with him to advantage."⁴³ On March 14

Lee's Legion made contact with Tarleton's advance guard and fixed it in place. Greene pressed his forces forward, deploying his formations near Guilford Courthouse. This ground was thoroughly familiar to Greene, for he had contemplated fighting the British here several weeks before and had personally scouted the ground. Greene was prepared to force an engagement because he had created conditions such that a British defeat would result in the total destruction of Cornwallis' army. "A [British] victory [on the other hand] [w]ould produce no very decisive consequence against the Americans."⁴⁴

Once again Cornwallis was in a dilemma of Greene's making. If he attacked and lost, his army would be destroyed. Should he attempt to withdraw, his command would be subjected to continual engagements by - Greene's cavalry and guerrilla formations. His only hope for victory was to destroy Greene totally. Cornwallis chose to attack. Greene had switched to the operational offensive, but maneuvered his opponent into a position where he could accrue the benefits of the tactical defense.

The Battle of Guilford Courthouse was one of the hardest fought of the American Revolution. For over four hours the contending armies were locked in battle. The 1st and 2nd Maryland Regiments along with the 1st Delaware Regiment exchanged volley fire and bayonet attacks. Twice Washington's cavalry and Lee's Legion slashed their way into the British right flank forcing the British center to halt its advance and to wheel to protect the disintegrating line. During the last of these two charges the 1st Maryland and the Virginia Continentals caught the center as it was maneuvering to face the cavalry. The 2nd Grenadiers broke and the rebels steadily pushed back the Royal Guards. Cornwallis, seeing his right flank

breaking under the combined cavalry and dragoon attack and his center locked in hand-to-hand combat, turned his guns on Americans and British alike. Greene refused to risk his army in a general advance. He conducted a disciplined withdrawal.

Cornwallis possessed the battlefield, but he had paid an exorbitant price for the privilege. Of the 2,000 regulars who faced Greene's forces that day, 515 had been killed or wounded, and 170 were prisoners. One third of Cornwallis' army was gone. Almost as serious was the loss of 27 officers and 28 noncommissioned officers. Two of his finest combat officers had fallen: Duncan Stuart had died on the field, and James Webster was mortally wounded. Tarleton was severely wounded and could not ride.

Greene's casualties, not counting the massive desertions by the militia during the first minutes of the battle, were less than 300. Greene wrote to his friend Joseph Reed:

We were obliged to give up ground and lost our artillery but the enemy have been so soundly beaten that they dare not move towards us since the action notwithstanding we lay within ten miles of him for two days. Except the ground and the artillery, they have gained no advantage. On the contrary, they are little short of ruined.⁴⁵

By "losing" the battle Greene had ruined Cornwallis' army. He had seized the initiative and had created favorable conditions to achieve his ends. Cornwallis claimed "victory", "with a third of my Army sick and wounded . . . the remainder without Shoes, and worn down with fatigue"⁴⁶ He was almost 200 miles from Wilmington on the coast and nearly 150 miles from Camden. Greene felt "perfectly easy" for he had indeed ruined Cornwallis' army as an effective fighting force.⁴⁷

Cornwallis was in the worst situation he had been in since the

beginning of the campaign. His army was "without tents or covering against the climate, and often without provisions The whole country is so totally destitute of subsistence, that forage is not nearer than nine miles, and the Soldiers have been two days without bread."⁴⁸ Now it was Cornwallis who was anxious to avoid battle. Cornwallis had two choices. First, he could attempt to unite with the British garrison at Camden. This would require a march that involved a series of river crossings during the continuing spring rains. Cornwallis knew that Marion and Sumter were operating in strength in the area beyond the Pee Dee so that, with Greene pressing his pursuit, the British would be assailed front and rear and possibly would be annihilated. The alternative would be a retreat down the Cape Fear River to Wilmington, where he could receive care for his sick and wounded, and possibly rebuild his defeated army. But to do so not only would be disastrous to the Loyalist cause in North Carolina, but also would leave the entire defense of the Carolinas upon the meager British force at Camden under Lieutenant Colonel Lord Rawdon and the scattered British posts in the backcountry. Cornwallis made the fateful decision to withdraw to Wilmington:

The immense distance from hence to Camden, the difficulty of subsistence on the road and the impracticability of the passage of the Pee Dee against an opposing enemy would render a direct movement totally useless to Lord Rawdon, and this Corps might be lost in the attempt.⁴⁹

Cornwallis felt that Greene would follow him to the southeast down the Cape Fear and that, even if he moved north into Virginia, his move would draw Greene away from South Carolina and prevent him from threatening Rawdon. As so often in the past, Cornwallis could not anticipate Greene's actions.

Greene remained focused on his operational end state: the destruction of British control of the Carolinas. After trailing Cornwallis a short distance toward Wilmington, Greene swung his army west toward Camden and South Carolina knowing that his departure would "oblige the Enemy to follow us or give up their posts."⁵⁰ With militia detachments controlling the majority of the North Carolina uplands, Greene marched directly for South Carolina. There British and Loyalist detachments remained in scattered garrisons and posts established to keep the country pacified. The return to South Carolina of the Southern Army bolstered militia and guerrilla spirits. Greene used his regular force to tie down the last British reserves under Lord Rawdon, thus allowing guerrilla and militia forces greater protection and freedom of action. Lee was sent to resume combined operations with Marion's guerrillas. They were highly successful in destroying small forts and detachments. The British operational center of gravity, Cornwallis' army, was damaged and too distant to affect the outcome. The 8,000 remaining British regulars in South Carolina were unable to concentrate freely enough or rapidly enough because of the activities of Marion and Lee.

Greene fought two more battles in South Carolina: at Hobkirk's Hill on April 25, and at Eutaw Springs on September 8. Again, as at Guilford Courthouse, the British claimed victory. However, in both battles, Greene inflicted over twice his casualties upon the British, and he created conditions which allowed his forces greater freedom of action. After each battle Greene's relative combat power was dramatically increased. One by one the British interior posts fell to Greene's army or to his guerrilla formations. By October 1781, the British had been forced

to withdraw to their port strongholds along the coast, Charleston and Savannah.' Greene had achieved his operational end. In so doing, he paved the way for the greater victory to follow at Yorktown.

V Conclusion

What can we learn from Greene's campaign? First is the fact that our concept of operational art does apply to insurgency war. The essence of operational art is the creation of favorable conditions which allow us to achieve the strategic ends desired within a theater of war. Current theory of operational art clearly helps us to understand insurgency war because it reaffirms the relationship of ends, means, ways, and risks. Insurgency war, due to its lack of means, must by necessity develop different ways to achieve its ends. Guerrilla, irregular, unconventional warfare is a way to overcome a stronger enemy who has greater means. The genius of Greene's campaign is that he had to create what little means he had. Because these means were limited to begin with, he had to concentrate on finding a way to defeat his enemy that increased his means while it weakened his enemy's.

Greene's "way" was to use guerrilla and conventional forces together to attack Cornwallis. Cornwallis, on the other hand, felt secure with the means he had available and therefore did not consider new ways of destroying Greene's forces. Cornwallis had the Loyalist forces necessary to develop new ways to counter Greene's use of guerrilla and regular

forces. These ways might have centered upon providing security to Loyalist forces. This could have created conditions that would force Greene to risk his forces to break the hold that the British had established in Georgia, South Carolina and the tidewater area of North Carolina. This plan would have required Cornwallis to retain a mobile force positioned to protect Loyalist and British forces controlling the interior. Thus, he could have frustrated Greene's campaign and continued to build a counterrevolution.

It is important to note that the destruction of Lincoln's and Gates' armies almost extinguished the military insurgency in the South. It required two disastrous decisions on the part of the British to destroy their own success. The first of these was Clinton's reversal of his pacification policy. By abandoning his lenient treatment of those who had renounced their support of the revolution and by allowing British and Loyalist forces to conduct a campaign of retribution against anyone not directly supporting the Crown, Clinton resurrected the insurgency. The second disastrous decision by the British was General Cornwallis' decision to invade North Carolina in an attempt to destroy Greene's army. Cornwallis failed to heed Clinton's instruction to protect South Carolina by retaining a sufficient reserve. Cornwallis instead concentrated all his forces including his strategic reserves located in Charleston and set off to search for and destroy Greene's army.

Both decisions created conditions necessary for Greene's success. However, General Greene had one other tremendous advantage that Cornwallis lacked. Greene, having clearly defined the operational end that would achieve the desired strategic ends, proceeded to analyze and correctly identify his enemy's operational center of gravity. By establishing the

correct operational center of gravity, he was able to carefully design a campaign that would result in its destruction. Greene's desired strategic end state was the destruction of British power in the South. His operational end state was the destruction of British military forces in the Carolinas. To achieve this, Greene concentrated on the destruction of the British operational center of gravity. Cornwallis, on the other hand, incorrectly identified Greene's operational center of gravity. This caused him to design a campaign that was faulty from its inception.

Germain had designated as his strategic end the detachment of the Southern colonies from the revolution. The operational end state was the creation of a Loyalist force necessary to maintain British control. British operational success depended upon Cornwallis' ability to provide Loyalist administration and military forces security from Greene's army and his guerrilla forces. Cornwallis disregarded this dual requirement in his single-minded attempt to destroy Greene's regular forces. But the destruction of Greene's army, unlike the destruction of Lincoln's or Gates', would not achieve Cornwallis' operational end state! Why? Again current operational concept gives us the answer.

Greene conducted a campaign with two operational centers of gravity. One was his guerrilla force which worked with his cavalry and dragoons and which often was augmented with militia. The other was his regular regiments of Continental infantry, also augmented with militia. Both worked in a complementary fashion aimed at destroying the British operational center of gravity which was Cornwallis' three regiments of infantry and cavalry. Nathanael Greene's genius was that he created two centers of gravity for his campaign. Depending upon the situation either

one, or the other, or both in combination could be his source of strength. By having two centers of gravity, General Greene could "protect the revolution". If one or the other was destroyed he could regenerate it. More importantly, each provided protection for the other. The guerrilla force provided Greene with operational and tactical intelligence. It protected Greene's regular force from surprise, and it directly aided the regular force by weakening Cornwallis' army and destroying Loyalist reinforcements. Greene's regular force protected his guerrilla force by insuring that the British could never employ numerous small units capable of pursuing and destroying guerrilla units without fear of being overwhelmed by Greene's regular force. These two centers of gravity had one other critical role in insuring Greene's success. They created the moral conditions necessary for militia forces to again take the field. Loyalist forces were strong enough and the Southern population divided enough that the immature political insurgency could not, on its own, guarantee success. If Cornwallis had destroyed these two centers of gravity, the militia, as it had after the defeat of Lincoln and Gates, would have submitted reluctantly to Loyalist and British control. The existence of Greene's forces provided the militia with enough assurance of success that they would once again willingly chance taking up arms. For this reason Greene was careful never to risk his forces unless he could be assured of success. In this way he could "protect the revolution." This, then, was Greene's solution to the problem of limited means. These two centers of gravity, his guerrilla forces and his regular formations, allowed Greene to design ways to destroy the British operational center of gravity. To accomplish this Greene used the concept of culminating points

and lines of operation to his advantage.

Greene used his regular forces to lure Cornwallis away from his base of operation around Charleston. By withdrawing through the Carolina back-country toward his base of operation, Greene made Cornwallis lengthen his lines of supply and communication, while Greene's became shorter. Soon Cornwallis was using a large portion of his force to keep these lines of operation open. Greene then instructed his guerrilla formations to sever Cornwallis' lines of operation and to isolate Cornwallis' army. By this method Greene increased his relative combat power at Cornwallis' expense. By falling back on his base of operation, Greene also gained the advantage of interior lines. His guerrilla formations allowed him simultaneously to have the advantage of exterior lines. With them he could converge on Cornwallis and encircle him at the correct moment. For Greene this moment occurred when he forced Cornwallis to overextend himself. By weakening Cornwallis through innumerable engagements with guerrilla forces, and by isolating him from his base of operation and depriving him of supplies and reinforcements, Greene could create conditions that would assure a successful conclusion to battle.

Several students of military art have remarked that Greene never won a battle yet he gained his operational end. This is an unfortunate statement, and it is based upon the narrowest understanding of the purpose of battle. The battle that ended at Guilford Courthouse began when Greene sent Washington and Lee's forces back across the Dan River and instructed his guerrilla forces to concentrate upon Cornwallis' rear. The engagements that were initiated against Cornwallis for the next two weeks make up the battle now named Guilford Courthouse. By using guerrilla and regular

forces, Greene extended the duration of time associated with battle. This was another way of effectively using limited means. The engagements conducted at Guilford Courthouse were the final effort of a protracted battle. After this battle Greene controlled the surrounding area of operation. He increased his relative combat power in relation to the British forces. More importantly, he gained greater freedom of action allowing him to achieve his operational ends. These achievements describe victory, not defeat. Greene's objective in battle was the destruction of the British army--not the retention of the battlefield. Greene was always aware of this. After Guilford Courthouse he stated his desire to sell the British "another field at the same price."⁵¹ For Greene the necessity of battle retained its importance as a means to achieve the operational ends.

This paper has attempted to show that insurgency war is not a unique form of war, but, rather, is a different way of using means to achieve a desired end. Nathanael Greene's insurgency war in the South can be clearly defined, analyzed, and understood using present military theory. It is a classic example of the application of operational art. Key theoretical concepts such as centers of gravity, lines of operation, culminating points, and the necessity for battle, remain valid. Perhaps our past and present frustrations in understanding and in dealing with insurgency war originate more from our refusal to apply operational art to insurgency war than from insurgency war's not applying to operational art.

ENDNOTES

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2. John Morgan Dederer, Making Bricks Without Straw: Nathanael Greene's Southern Campaign and Mao-Tse Tung's Mobile War, (Manhattan, Kansas: Sunflower University Press, 1983) pp. 5-7. Also see Russell F. Weigley, History of the United States Army, (New York: Macmillan, 1967), pp. 36-37. Also see Robert B. Asprey, War in the Shadows, the Guerrilla in History, Vol 1, (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1975), Vol. 1. pp. 123-128.
3. Field Circular (FC) 100-20 Low Intensity Conflict, (United States Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 16 July 1986), p. 2-2.
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7. Ibid., pp. 10-11. Also Appendix B, pp. 179-182.
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29. Ibid.
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35. Higginbotham, p. 367.
36. Pancake, p. 139.
37. John Richard Alden, The South in the Revolution 1763-1789, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1957), pp. 255-256.
38. (FM) 100-5, p. 32.
39. Alden, p. 253.
40. Dederer, p. 52.

41. (FM) 100-5, p. 180.
42. Ibid.
43. Pancake, p. 177.
44. Dederer, p. 53.
45. Dederer, p. 54.
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